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NATO Intervention on Trial:
The Legal Case That Was Never Made
Paul Williams
Michael P. Scharf
The United States and its NATO allies have defended the air strikes against
Yugoslavia on moral grounds (to stop atrocities) and security grounds (to prevent the conflict from spilling over to neighboring European countries), but
curiously they have never articulated a legal justification for the intervention.
The nearest the NATO countries have come to articulating a legal rationale
has been to cite various resolutions of the Security Council, in which the Council
has determined that the actions of Yugoslavia in Kosovo constitute a threat to
peace and security in the region and, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded a halt to such actions. Notably, however, these resolutions do
not employ the talismanic phrase, “States may take all necessary means...”which
would constitute an express Security Council authorization of the use of force.
The failure of the NATO countries to articulate a legal basis for their humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is puzzling in that there are in fact several
compelling legal arguments that could be made to justify the Kosovo intervention. The reason for this silence may be that each possible legal underpinning carries with it the specter of a practical consequence that the NATO
countries traditionally hope to avoid. Unfortunately the policy of silence is a
blunt and weak tool for navigating these concerns and, in the long term, frequently exacerbates the concerns and validates the objections to the legitimate use of force for humanitarian intervention.
The policy of avoiding the articulation of a legal rationale for NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo reached its peak on May 11, 1999, when
the International Court of Justice heard oral arguments in a case brought by
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the United States and nine other
NATO countries.1 Representing Yugoslavia, the British international law expert Ian Brownlie argued that 1) the NATO intervention was an unlawful use
of force because it violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which provided that
each state is entitled to territorial integrity and political independence, 2) the
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members of NATO breached the 1949 Geneva Conventions by targeting civilians and using depleted uranium weapons, and 3) the attack against the FRY
constituted a form of genocide in violation of the Genocide Convention. The
United States and its NATO allies declined to rebuff these arguments. Rather,
they challenged the Court’s jurisdiction on technical grounds.
While the technical arguments were successful for some of the plaintiffs,
what the NATO member states failed to grasp was that Yugoslavia was using
the norm and institutions of justice to seek a victory not primarily in the courtroom in The Hague, but in the court of public opinion. By making his case
before the World Court (and the world media), Yugoslav President Slobodan
Miloševic´ took another step in his quest to level the moral playing field between Yugoslavia and NATO—and to employ the principle of moral equivalence which served him well in the Bosnian conflict. Coming amidst reports
that NATO bombs had gone astray or were misdirected—destroying hospitals, civilian convoys, and even the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade—the case
before the World Court further eroded public support for the NATO policy of
continuing air strikes and decreased the general support for the potential deployment of a NATO ground force.
´ strategy if
The NATO countries may have successfully blunted Miloševic’s
they had outlined the legal case for the airstrikes early in the campaign, or at
least during the preliminary stages of the case. The NATO countries could
have, for example, argued that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide obliges those countries which have
ratified it, including the NATO countries, to “undertake to prevent and to punish”genocide.2 Moreover, it could reasonably be argued that the duty to cooperate in the prevention of genocide has attained the level of a preemptory
norm of international law (jus cogens).3 Such norms supersede other treaty
rights and obligations. Further, the NATO countries could have successfully
argued that as a party to the Genocide Convention, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has by implication waived its right to invoke territorial integrity to
shield it from international action to halt genocide.
This argument would have been particularly compelling had the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issued an indictment
for Miloševic´ charging him with genocide.Yet, given the Western governments’
internal debate as to whether an indictment of Miloševic´ would frustrate
the possibility of attaining a negotiated peace settlement, and their
consequent delay in providing the necessary information to the Tribunal to
support an indictment, it was not until May 24 that the Tribunal issued its
indictment.4 Importantly, the Tribunal failed to indict Miloševic´ on charges of
genocide, instead limiting the charges to war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
Had the NATO countries sought to avail themselves of the opportunity to
justify their humanitarian intervention, they could have asserted that inter-
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vention designed to prevent grave human rights abuses is not prohibited by
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As that Article is designed to prohibit the use of
force aimed against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state
(unless such force is authorized by the Security Council or is taken in selfdefense), the NATO countries could have successfully argued that, since they
explicitly rejected claims of independence for Kosovo and publicly reaffirmed
the territorial integrity and political independence of Yugoslavia, the purpose
of the air strikes could not be construed to either impair territorial integrity or
to challenge political independence.5
NATO’s reluctance to rely on this legal rationale reflects fears that the precedent would encourage other countries to intervene in less altruistic circumstances. It was for this reason that the Western countries condemned the Indian
invasion of Bangladesh in 1971 and the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979.6
While these invasions put an end to mass slaughters, in each case the selfinterest of the invading state was clearly involved.7 NATO apparently feared
that it might be perceived as building on this precedent, as its strategy at times
appeared calculated more to punish and declaw the Miloševic´ regime for its
past atrocities than to halt the human rights abuses being committed.Yet fears
of abusive invocation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention must be
balanced against the compelling need for a contemporary and realistic interpretation of Article 2(4) in light of the re-emergence of Security Council paralysis in the face of mass atrocities. With NATO’s movement toward the
introduction of ground troops and increasing attacks directed at those military
units responsible for the continued atrocities in Kosovo, NATO cleared the
presumption of political self-interest which tainted the Indian and Tanzanian
actions.
NATO might also have argued that based on the facts pertaining to the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the failure of Serbia/Montenegro to
be recognized as a state under international law, its actions did not contravene
article 2(4). When Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Macedonia achieved their
independence, the Security Council declared in Resolution 777 of 1992 that
Serbia/Montenegro did not continue the international legal personality of the
former Yugoslavia and thus was not entitled to continue the UN membership
of the former Yugoslavia, a position that was confirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 47/1. 8 Given Kosovo’s claim for independence and
Montenegro’s indication that it might seek to secede as well, the legal process
of dissolution may legitimately be considered to be continuing. Thus, an argument could be made that Serbia/Montenegro does not possess full rights of
sovereignty and territorial integrity as protected by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Notably, several of the NATO countries referenced S.C. Res. 777 and G.A.
Res. 47/1 in their statements to the World Court, but they argued only that
Serbia/Montenegro does not have a right to bring a case since it is not a party
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to the UN Charter. The problem with taking the argument to the next level is
that if Serbia/Montenegro were not deemed a sovereign state, it might argue
that it could not be held responsible for failing to abide by the treaties of the
formerYugoslavia, including the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. This concern should not be overstated, however, since non-state actors may still be held personally responsible for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide under customary international law and principles of
jus cogens.
A final argument which NATO could have made to justify its humanitarian
intervention is that the people of Kosovo are entitled to self-determination
and thus to exercise their right of collective self-defense. Even Ian Brownlie,
the counsel for Yugoslavia, recognized that self-determination has become a
peremptory norm of international law.9 As the Kosovo Albanians represent a
clearly defined group of people with a distinct identity who have been systematically denied fundamental human rights and the opportunity to engage
in collective democratic self-governance, they are entitled to self-determination. In the very unique circumstances facing the people of Kosovo, the internationally recognized right of self-determination includes the right to resort
to force (other than by terrorism) and to seek independence.10
The question is slightly more complicated when it relates to whether the
right of self-determination includes the right to call upon other states to engage in collective self-defense against the aggression of a totalitarian regime.
The International Court of Justice rejected the Reagan Administration’s attempt to assert such a rationale for intervening in Nicaragua in 1985, stating
“[t]he Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right
of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the latter has
opted for some particular ideology or political system.”11 But the situation in
Kosovo is different in that NATO is not intervening to impose democratic
government in Yugoslavia, but to protect the Kosovo Albanians from ethnic
cleansing and genocide. Of course, making this argument would have required
the United States to indicate its willingness to recognize Kosovo’s independence—a step which may have complicated relations with certain European
states unwilling to contemplate an independent Kosovo.
Given their potential downsides, NATO’s reluctance to embrace one or more
of these legal justifications is perhaps understandable, though misconceived.
Although NATO successfully concluded its air campaign, the lack of an articulated legal stance weakened international and domestic support for the
intervention, undermined the authority of the Security Council, and diminished international respect for the rule of law.
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